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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this case, filed under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, 20 U.S.C. SS 1400-1490, the Scranton 
School District appeals from an order granting attorneys' 
fees to the parents of Daniel S. under S 1415(i)(3)(B) of the 
Act. The School District argues that the meeting for which 
attorneys' fees were awarded was not "convened as a result 
of an administrative proceeding or judicial action," and that 
the fee award was thus barred by the Act. We disagree, and 
will affirm the District Court's order. 
 
I. Background Law 
 
Congress enacted the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act to ensure that educational programs were 
available to children with disabilities, to enable responsible 
educational authorities to provide appropriate educational 
programs, and to assure the effectiveness of such 
programs. See 20 U.S.C. S 1400(d). To that end, the Act 
provides financial assistance to states that comply with its 
requirements. See id. SS 1411, 1412. One provision requires 
each participating state to identify and evaluate the needs 
of all children residing within its borders who are disabled 
and who need special education or related services. See id. 
S 1412(a)(3)(A). 
 
Once the state has identified and evaluated a disabled 
child in need of special education and related services, it 
must have an Individual Educational Program (IEP) in effect 
for that child at the beginning of each school year. See id. 
S 1414(d)(2)(A); see also id. S 1414(d)(1)(A) (identifying the 
required components of an IEP). Each IEP is designed by an 
"IEP Team" composed of the parents of the child, a multi- 
disciplinary collection of appropriately qualified educational 
professionals, and, when appropriate, the child. See id. 
S 1414(d)(1)(B). 
 
The Act requires participating states to establish a 
comprehensive set of procedural safeguards designed to 
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protect the interests of all parties. See id.  S 1415. One such 
safeguard allows parents who have lodged complaints about 
the identification, evaluation, placement, or IEP 
development processes to request an impartial 
administrative due-process hearing. See id.S 1415(f)(1). If 
the hearing is conducted by a local educational agency, any 
party aggrieved by its findings and decision may appeal to 
the state educational agency. See id. S 1415(g). If, however, 
the hearing is conducted by the state educational agency, 
an aggrieved party may bring a civil action in a state court 
of competent jurisdiction or in federal district court. See id. 
S 1415(i)(2). 
 
In addition to granting other appropriate relief, a court 
may, in its discretion, "award reasonable attorneys' fees to 
the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing 
party." Id. S 1415(i)(3)(B). Following a 1997 amendment, 
however, "[a]ttorneys' fees may not be awarded relating to 
any meeting of the IEP Team unless such meeting is 
convened, [inter alia], as a result of an administrative 
proceeding or judicial action." Id.S 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii) (emphasis 
added). It is this limitation, and its application to a specific 
IEP Team meeting, that is at issue in this appeal. 
 
II. Background Facts & Procedure 
 
In December 1996, the Scranton School District 
identified Daniel S. as a student in need of special 
educational services. An IEP Team consisting of Daniel's 
parents and education professionals engaged in a series of 
meetings intended to produce an IEP for Daniel. The School 
District then presented Daniel's parents with an IEP, which 
they rejected. The School District again presented the same 
IEP, which Daniel's parents again rejected. 
 
Sometime during the summer of 1997, the advocate 
representing Daniel's interests in the IEP process contacted 
Mary Anne Clausen, a private attorney specializing in 
education law. See App. at 191:15-23. Thereafter, Daniel's 
advocate "from time to time asked [Clausen] a few 
questions about things" concerning the effort to develop an 
acceptable IEP for Daniel. See id. 
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In August, the IEP Team met again, but again failed to 
produce a mutually acceptable IEP. The School District 
then requested an administrative due-process hearing to 
determine the adequacy of the IEP it was offering Daniel. A 
hearing was scheduled, and, in the interim, Daniel's 
parents decided it would be best to teach him at home until 
an appropriate IEP was in place at school. 
 
While awaiting the hearing, Daniel's mother contacted 
Attorney Clausen directly concerning truancy proceedings 
that the School District had initiated against Daniel. See id. 
at 192:8-193:15. Attorney Clausen had further 
conversations on the truancy matter with Daniel's mother 
and with his advocate in the ensuing weeks. See id. at 
194:20-195:15. Ultimately, Attorney Clausen performed a 
few minor legal services on Daniel's behalf regarding the 
truancy proceedings against him. See id. at 196:2-197:9. 
 
In September, the IEP Team then met again for a third 
time, but again failed to produce a mutually acceptable IEP 
for Daniel. Shortly thereafter, the School District presented 
his parents with a revised IEP that conceded to some, but 
not all, of their demands. In response, Daniel's mother sent 
the School District a letter explaining why she was 
dissatisfied with the latest IEP and setting forth her 
remaining demands. See id. at 197:15-22; 203:11-19; 
207:16-18. 
 
Daniel's parents asked Attorney Clausen to represent 
them in their continuing battle with the School District over 
Daniel's IEP. See id. at 197:23-198:1. In the hope that the 
parties would be able to resolve the matter without her 
assistance, Attorney Clausen refused to represent them 
until after they had received a response to their letter. See 
id. 
 
In October, the School District sent Daniel's parents yet 
another version of the IEP, conceding to some, but again 
not all, of the demands expressed in their previous letter. 
Thereafter, Attorney Clausen "entered into a retainer 
agreement [with Daniel's parents] to negotiate on their 
behalf at that point in time and to see if we could get a 
settlement of the matter for them." Id. at 198:13-24. 
Daniel's parents rejected the School District's latest IEP 
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and, on the same rejection form, checked a box requesting 
a due process hearing. See id. at 479. 
 
Attorney Clausen called the School District's attorney 
and requested a "settlement conference" to break the 
impasse. More specifically, she explained that the efforts to 
produce a mutually acceptable IEP for Daniel "had been 
ongoing for a long time" and that she would "like to try to 
settle it rather than going to due process." Id. at 212:24- 
213:4. The School District's attorney agreed, and the 
parties met on October 20 and signed an attendance sheet 
labeled "Settlement Conference." See id.  at 46. 
 
The School District made a number of concessions at the 
conference and, in the course of the ensuing few days, 
made several more. As a result, the parties produced a 
mutually acceptable IEP that Daniel's mother signed. The 
request for a due-process hearing was then withdrawn. 
Shortly thereafter, Attorney Clausen asked the School 
District to pay her fees related to the October 20 settlement 
conference and subsequent services rendered on Daniel's 
behalf. When the School District refused, Daniel's parents 
filed a civil action in the District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania. Following a bench trial, the 
District Court entered an order awarding attorneys' fees to 
Daniel's parents. 
 
In a memorandum explaining its order, the District Court 
found that the October 20 conference was not a settlement 
conference at all. In "the Court's view," because everyone 
who attended the meeting, with the exception of Attorney 
Clausen, was a member of the IEP Team, "regardless of 
what the meeting was labeled, it was a meeting of the IEP 
Team within the meaning of the Act." Dist. Ct. Mem. of 
02/12/1999 at 3. The District Court also concluded that 
the School District's request for a due process hearing had 
"initiated" an "administrative proceeding." Id. at 5. The 
court further concluded that "[g]iven the initiation of that 
proceeding, and the impending hearing, it is inescapable 
that the meeting of October 20, 1997 . . . was convened as 
a result of the administrative proceeding." Id. 
 
The District Court concluded: 
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       It seems quite clear . . . that counsel fees may be 
       awarded in any instance where a party prevails as a 
       result of an IEP team meeting which is convened as a 
       result of an administrative proceeding. Such is exactly 
       what occurred here, and therefore fees will be awarded 
       to . . . plaintiff 's counsel. 
 
Id. at 6. The School District disagrees that the meeting was 
"convened as a result of an administrative hearing," and 
appeals from the order awarding Attorney Clausen's fees. 
 
III. Discussion 
 
The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether the 1997 
amendment of the Act bars this award of attorneys' fees. 
The parties both contend that "[t]his case isfirst and 
foremost a matter of statutory construction." Appellee's Br. 
at 10; see also Appellant's Br. at 12 ("The Appellant 
believes that the language of S 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii) is clear, 
unambiguous and therefore no further analysis is 
required."). To a degree, they are correct. But resolution of 
this issue ultimately does not turn on a question of law. 
The operative statutory phrase calls for the Court to 
determine if the IEP team meeting was "convened as a 
result of an administrative proceeding," thus raising a 
question of causation. 
 
In applying the pre-1997-amendment version of S 1415, 
we have held that causation can be established on either of 
two theories. See Wheeler v. Towanda Area School Dist., 
950 F.2d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 1991) (considering when 
litigation is casually connected to the relief obtained by a 
prevailing party). In the context of pre-amendmentS 1415, 
litigation was held to be causally connected to the relief if 
it either produced that relief directly (i.e., through a 
favorable judgment), or, under an alternative "catalyst" 
theory, if "the pressure of the lawsuit was a material 
contributing factor in bringing about extrajudicial relief." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
 
In the context of this case, an administrative proceeding 
can be causally connected to the prevailing party's relief if 
the pressure of the proceeding was a material contributing 
factor in bringing about the relief sought and ultimately 
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obtained by the child's parents. Thus, the real question in 
this case is one of fact: was the scheduled due process 
hearing the catalyst for the October 20 meeting that 
ultimately produced a mutually acceptable Program for 
Daniel? 
 
The School District takes no issue with the District 
Court's conclusion that the October 20 meeting was an IEP 
Team meeting, but argues, essentially, that an IEP Team 
meeting can never be convened as a result of an 
administrative hearing that has not yet occurred. See 
Appellant's Br. at 10. That is incorrect. An administrative 
hearing need not actually have occurred for it to be the 
cause of an IEP Team meeting. The mere threat of a 
scheduled hearing alone may induce opposing parties to 
agree to meetings in which they would not otherwise have 
participated, if only to avoid the cost, burden and 
uncertainty of the hearing itself. Cf. Sullivan v. 
Pennsylvania Dep't of Labor & Indus., 663 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 
1981) (finding the requisite causal link to recover attorneys' 
fees on Title VII claim where EEOC complaint caused union 
to take case to arbitration where relief was ultimately 
granted). 
 
Despite a series of IEP Team meetings, as well as 
exchanges in writing and by telephone, the parties were 
unable to produce a mutually acceptable IEP for Daniel. By 
September 3, the School District had determined that the 
Program it was offering Daniel was appropriate, and that 
IEP Team meetings were becoming "off focus" and 
"counterproductive." App. at 336:19-23. In short, it, too, 
had lost confidence in the IEP Team process, and had 
decided that a due process hearing would likely be 
necessary to break the impasse. Thereafter, the parties held 
one more "regular" IEP Team meeting on September 30. 
 
The October 20 meeting at issue was unlike the previous 
meetings in several significant respects. First, by the time 
the October 20 meeting was scheduled Daniel's parents had 
made their own request for a due process hearing, implying 
that they believed the IEP Team process had broken down. 
Second, whereas all prior meetings had been scheduled by 
the parties themselves following the notice requirements set 
forth in the Act, the October 20 meeting was scheduled by 
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the parties' respective attorneys. Third, although the 
attorneys did not attend any of the previous meetings, and 
Daniel's attorney declined to become directly involved in the 
IEP process until it was clear that the IEP Team was 
deadlocked and an administrative hearing was imminent, 
both attorneys attended the October 20 meeting. See App. 
at 46. As noted, the District Court concluded that the 
School District's September 3 request for a due process 
hearing "initiated" an administrative proceeding. See Dist. 
Ct. Mem. of 02/12/1999 at 5. 
 
We reject the parties' invitation to formulate a bright-line 
test for determining when an IEP Team meeting results 
from an administrative proceeding. Under Appellant's 
proffered test, an IEP Team meeting would never result 
from an administrative proceeding if it occurs before the 
administrative proceeding has actually been convened. 
Conversely, Appellees ask us to hold that an IEP Team 
meeting results from an administrative proceeding any time 
it occurs after the administrative proceeding has been 
requested, whether or not the requested proceeding was the 
catalyst for the meeting in question. We reject both tests, 
and hold that whether a particular IEP Team meeting 
results from an administrative proceeding is first a factual 
question of causation, opening the District court'sfindings 
to our review for clear error. Thereafter, the decision to 
award fees remains within the discretion of the court. See 
20 U.S.C. S 1415(i)(3)(B), which we review for an abuse in 
the exercise of its discretion. 
 
Against this factual backdrop, we see no error in the 
District Court's finding the meeting was convened as a 
result of the pending administrative hearing, nor in its 
determination that the pending due process hearing was 
the catalyst for the October 20 IEP Team meeting. Looking 
at the facts, we cannot accept the School District's claims 
that it was merely being proactive when it filed its 
September 3 request for a due process hearing. The 
evidence is to the contrary. The record indicates that by the 
time the School District requested a due process hearing it 
had concluded that the IEP Team process had become 
unfocused and counterproductive. Although it subsequently 
scheduled one final IEP Team meeting for September 30, 
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that meeting was also unproductive. By the time the parties 
scheduled the October 20 meeting, all involved believed the 
IEP Team process had reached an impasse and that a due 
process hearing was imminent without the successful 
intervention by their attorneys. Accordingly, we conclude 
that the District Court's finding that the October 20 
meeting was convened as a result of the due process 
hearing scheduled for November 10 is fully supported by 
the evidence. Upon that finding, an award of attorney fees 
was well within its discretion. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
We hold that the District Court did not err in finding, as 
a matter of fact, that the IEP Team meeting at issue in this 
case was convened as a result of an administrative 
proceeding, nor did it abuse its discretion by awarding fees. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's order. 
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BECKER, Chief Judge, concurring in the judgment: 
 
Under the 1997 amendments to IDEA, on which the 
School District relies, "[a]ttorneys' fees may not be awarded 
relating to any meeting of the IEP Team unless such 
meeting is convened as a result of an administrative 
proceeding or judicial action." 20 U.S.C. S 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). 
Consequently, the School District can prevail only if: (1) the 
October 20 meeting was one of Daniel's IEP Team; and (2) 
the meeting was not convened as a result of an 
administrative proceeding or judicial action. The Court 
agrees that the October 20 meeting was an IEP Team 
Meeting, but affirms the District Court's judgment awarding 
fees because it concludes that the meeting took place as a 
result of the due process hearing scheduled for November 
10. 
 
The linchpin of the Court's holding is its conclusion that 
the District Court's "factual" finding "that the pending due 
process hearing was the catalyst for the October 20 IEP 
Team meeting" was not clearly erroneous. See opinion of the 
Court at 8. I disagree. No administrative proceeding ever 
took place, and none was even scheduled to occur prior to 
November 10--three weeks after the October 20 meeting. 
While the October 20 meeting may have occurred as a 
result of the School District's decision to initiate the 
administrative process and in anticipation of the scheduled 
due process hearing, the statute simply does not refer to 
IEP Team Meetings "convened as a result of the initiation of 
an administrative process" or "convened in anticipation of 
an administrative proceeding." 
 
On the other hand, I also believe that--under any 
standard of review--the October 20 meeting was not an IEP 
Team Meeting. IDEA contains no definition of the phrase 
"meeting of the IEP Team." Absent a definition or other 
controlling authority, I would hold that parties may clearly 
designate a meeting as a settlement conference rather than 
an IEP Team Meeting, and I believe that that precept is 
satisfied in this case. The October 20 meeting was 
scheduled by counsel for the parents as a settlement 
conference, and, with the exception of the parents' attorney, 
every person at the October 20 meeting signed a sheet 
referring to it as a "Settlement Conference." Although 
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lawyers are not designated as being part of an IEP Team, 
two attorneys (one for the parents and one for the School 
District) attended the October 20 meeting. 
 
The impetus for and subject of the meeting was likewise 
closer to that of a settlement conference than of an IEP 
Team meeting because the parties were, at that point, 
trying to avoid the need for a due process hearing, rather 
than simply attempting to arrive at an IEP that was best for 
Daniel. In addition, the School District did not give the 
parents formal notice of the October 20 meeting-- 
something that Pennsylvania law explicitly requires it to do 
before an IEP Team Meeting. I therefore conclude that the 
October 20 meeting was not an IEP Team Meeting within 
the meaning of IDEA, and would affirm the judgment on 
this ground. 
 
I. 
 
To explain the rationale behind the conclusions I reach, 
it is necessary to recapitulate the chronology of events. In 
December 1996, the Scranton School District identified 
Daniel S. as a "child with a disability" as that term is 
defined under IDEA. With the assistance of Daniel's 
parents, the School District prepared a comprehensive 
evaluation of Daniel's disabilities. When Daniel's IEP Team 
began meeting, however, it could not agree on a plan for 
him. Without an IEP in place, Daniel was forced to remain 
out of school between January and November of 1997. 
 
During those ten months, Daniel's parents and other 
members of his IEP Team met or had discussions on 
numerous occasions. IEP Team Meetings took place on 
April 1, April 29, and August 27, 1997, but the Team was 
unable to agree on an IEP because Daniel's parents felt that 
none of the proposals adequately accounted for his special 
needs. In early September, the School District officially 
requested a due process hearing at which an independent 
third party would be asked to determine Daniel's fate. In an 
effort to avoid this result, the IEP Team met one more time 
on September 30, 1997. Daniel's parents rejected the IEP 
proposed at the meeting and hired an attorney, Mary Ann 
Clausen, to represent them at the due process hearing. 
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With the due process hearing scheduled for November 
10, 1997, Clausen contacted the School District and 
requested that a meeting be held in an attempt to resolve 
matters before the hearing. In scheduling the meeting, 
Clausen characterized it as a "settlement conference," and 
counsel for the School District did not object to this 
characterization. The parties, including most of Daniel's IEP 
Team, assembled on October 20, 1997. This was first time 
that lawyers for both the School District and Daniel's 
parents attended a meeting regarding Daniel. All of the 
parties (except Clausen) at the October 20 meeting signed 
an attendance sheet labeled with the heading "Settlement 
Conference." The parties discussed Daniel's IEP, but came 
to no agreement regarding Daniel's educational plan. 
 
The October 20 meeting proved fruitful, for it paved the 
way for further informal conversations and exchanges of 
information between the parties. Based on these exchanges, 
an IEP was agreed upon and signed by Daniel's mother on 
October 31, 1997. The IEP that Daniel's mother signed was 
more favorable to Daniel than the School District's previous 
proposals had been. With the October 31 agreement in 
effect, the adversarial proceeding scheduled for November 
10 was rendered unnecessary. 
 
II. 
 
Because the District Court concluded that the October 20 
meeting was one of Daniel's IEP Team, it was required to 
consider whether the meeting was "convened as a result of 
an administrative proceeding." 20 U.S.C. S 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). 
The Court reasoned that the October 20 meeting was 
"convened as a result of " the School District's decision to 
request the due process hearing scheduled for November 10 
and in anticipation thereof. Specifically, Court stated that: 
 
       [g]iven the initiation of that proceeding, and the 
       impending hearing [on November 10], it is inescapable 
       that the meeting of October 20, 1997 which resulted in 
       an acceptable plan on October 31, 1997, was convened 
       as a result of the administrative proceeding. There 
       appears to be no other requirement under the plain 
       meaning and plain language of the statute. 
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The Court agrees with the District Court, characterizing the 
inquiry as "a factual question of causation" reviewable for 
clear error. Opinion of the court at 8. I disagree. 
 
The key question is whether an IEP Team Meeting can be 
convened as a result of a due process hearing that has not 
yet taken place. This is a question of law because it 
involves statutory interpretation. And because it is a 
question of law, the appropriate standard of review is de 
novo.1 See United States v. Zwick, 199 F.3d 672, 678 (3d 
Cir. 1999) ("We exercise plenary review over questions of 
statutory interpretation."). Neither the Supreme Court nor 
any court of appeals has previously considered this issue. 
Absent binding precedent, we must follow the Supreme 
Court's repeated admonition that where a statute's text is 
clear, the task of interpretation begins and ends there. See 
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999). 
 
The relevant portion of the statutory text refers to IEP 
Team Meetings "convened as a result of an administrative 
proceeding." There is no dispute that the due process 
hearing scheduled to take place on November 10 would 
have qualified as an "administrative proceeding" within the 
meaning of IDEA. The question, therefore, is whether the 
October 20 meeting was "convened as a result of " the due 
process hearing scheduled for November 10. In the absence 
of a statutory definition or some other compelling reason, 
we interpret the words of a statute in accord with their 
ordinary meaning. Result means "a consequence, effect, 
issue, or conclusion." Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 1937 (1966). An event (such as an IEP Team 
Meeting) cannot be a "consequence" of another event (such 
as a due process hearing) that has not yet occurred nor can 
an "effect" precede its purported cause. 
 
This common sense interpretation is supported by the 
ways in which the phrase "as a result of " is used in other 
sections of the United States Code. Its only other use in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. I agree with the Court that if, as a matter of law, an IEP Team Meeting 
can occur "as a result of " a due process hearing that has not yet taken 
place, the question whether a particular IEP Team Meeting did so occur 
would be a question of fact that would be reviewable for clear error. See 
opinion of the Court at 8. 
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IDEA provides that "[a]s a result of more than 20 years of 
Federal support for research . . . , there is an important 
knowledge base for improving results for children with 
disabilities." 20 U.S.C. S 1471(a)(2)(A). Other provisions of 
the United States Code use "as a result of " in a similar 
manner--i.e., one that makes clear that an event may not 
be the result of another event that has yet to occur.2 
 
I can think of but three ways, none of them satisfactory, 
to blur this clear statutory language. The first would be to 
read the statute as saying "unless such meeting is 
convened as a result of the initiation of or request for an 
administrative proceeding." The second would be to read 
the statute as saying "unless such a meeting is convened in 
anticipation of an administrative proceeding." The problem, 
of course, is that these alternate formulations are simply 
not in the statute and their insertion would substantively 
alter its meaning. A final possibility would be to conclude 
that the commencement of the administrative proceedings 
took place when the School District requested the due 
process hearing. But this argument ignores the fact that 
the statute does not say "administrative process," it says 
"administrative proceeding," and the only administrative 
proceeding that even potentially qualifies in this case never 
occurred. 
 
The only judicial decisions I have been able to locate 
dealing with this issue support my reading of the statute. 
The first, M.V. v. Gordon, No. 98 C 8408, 1999 WL 417394 
(N.D. Ill., June 15, 1999), involved a 13-year-old boy who 
had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder. M.V. was suspended from school after he engaged 
in what seems to have been highly inappropriate behavior. 
His parents submitted a request for a due process hearing. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. S 1103(b)(3) (relaxing publishing requirements for 
new federal regulations that are "temporary in nature and [are] 
necessary to be implemented expeditiously as a result of an emergency"); 
8 U.S.C. S 1440-1(b) (allowing for posthumous grant of citizenship to 
certain noncitizens who served in the United States armed forces and 
"died as a result of injury or disease incurred in or aggravated by that 
service"); 10 U.S.C. S 829(a) (stating that members of a court martial may 
not be "absent or excused after the court has been assembled for the 
trial of the accused unless excused as a result of a challenge"). 
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An IEP Team Meeting was convened and a settlement was 
reached that rendered the due process hearing 
unnecessary. Id. at *1. The parents thenfiled an action to 
recover attorneys fees "relating [to] IEP meetings." See id. at 
*2. The court granted the school district's motion to 
dismiss, finding the language of the 1997 amendments 
"clear and unambiguous." Id. Responding to the parents' 
claim "that it was their request for a due process hearing 
. . . that was the `catalyst for the relief obtained,' " the court 
stated: 
 
       Plaintiffs have not demonstrated how the hearing 
       request alone entitles them to fees. Although Plaintiff[s] 
       cite cases which granted recovery of fees in similar 
       situations [citing the parents' brief], those cases pre- 
       date the 1997 IDEA amendments which now clearly 
       limit recovery of fees Plaintiffs seek unless they are the 
       result of "an administrative proceeding or judicial 
       action." Plaintiffs have not established that the[School] 
       District convened the IEP meeting as a result of an 
       "administrative proceeding." On the contrary, Plaintiffs' 
       own allegations reveal that the [School] District took a 
       proactive role at an early opportunity thereby removing 
       the need for administrative proceedings. 
 
Id. at *3. Accordingly, the court denied the request for 
attorneys fees. See id. 
 
The case most heavily relied upon by Daniel's parents, 
F.R. v. Board of Education, 67 F. Supp. 2d 142 (E.D.N.Y. 
1999), provides little support for their claim that attorneys 
fees may be awarded in this case. Although the Court in 
F.R. awarded fees for work done prior to a due process 
hearing, the fees requested were not intended to 
compensate an attorney for attending an IEP Team Meeting. 
The court noted that: 
 
       [P]laintiffs do not seek fees in connection with their 
       attorney's presence at the CSE meetings held to 
       develop and modify [the child's] IEP. . . . Instead . . . 
       [the] fees sought to be reimbursed relate to attorney 
       work performed in connection with investigation of the 
       case, discussions with opposing counsel, client 
       meetings and preparations of requests for impartial 
       hearings. 
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Id. at 148 (emphasis added). In contrast, as the facts are 
interpreted by the Court, this case involves a request for 
fees for attending an IEP Team Meeting. F.R. provides no 
support that such fees are recoverable after the 1997 
amendments.3 
 
III. 
 
The rule announced by the Court today will undermine 
the goal of the 1997 amendments, which was to make IDEA 
less costly for local school districts. The (admittedly limited) 
means chosen to accomplish this goal involved restricting 
the ability of parents to recover attorneys fees associated 
with attendance at IEP Team Meetings. The causation test 
adopted by the Court will allow one party (parents, or, more 
accurately, their lawyers) to undermine these limits 
unilaterally by requesting a due process hearing early on so 
that they can claim that any subsequent IEP Team 
Meetings occurred as a result of that request. Even if courts 
often reject such claims on the grounds that a causal 
connection between the request for a hearing and the 
resolution of the dispute is lacking, the litigation over fees 
will itself be costly and time-consuming for school districts. 
 
On the other hand, a rule that attorneys fees are never 
recoverable for any meeting that occurs prior to an 
administrative proceeding would likewise undermine the 
purpose of the 1997 amendments. The costs of paying for 
parents' attorneys to attend a successful settlement 
conference will almost always be lower than the costs 
associated with their attendance at a due process hearing. 
But if parents' lawyers could not recover fees for attending 
settlement conferences but could recover them for 
attending due process hearings, then they would lack an 
incentive to try to settle disputes prior to a hearing. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The only other cases cited by the parties are unhelpful in resolving 
this issue. In Lucht v. Molalla River School District, 57 F. Supp. 2d 
1060, 
1062 (D. Ore. 1999), the IEP Team Meeting for which the parents 
demanded fees occurred after a due process hearing had taken place. 
And Christopher P. v. Upper Merion Area School District, No. CIV A. 99- 
402 (E.D. Pa., Jan. 19, 2000), does not discuss the impact of the 1997 
amendments. 
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Accordingly, an ideal system to hold down overall costs 
must take account of (and encourage) bona fide settlement 
conferences. 
 
I believe that the best way to hold down overall costs is 
to allow parties to designate meetings as settlement 
conferences rather than IEP Team Meetings. The special 
education world is largely made up of sophisticated, repeat- 
player counsel for both parents and school districts. A clear 
rule that attorneys fees are not recoverable for pre-hearing 
meetings unless the parties agree that the meeting is a 
settlement conference rather than an IEP Team Meeting 
would allow the parties to agree ex ante whether a given 
meeting may later be subject to a claim for fees. School 
districts will not agree to a settlement conference, however, 
unless and until they conclude that further resort to the 
non-adversarial IEP process is unlikely to yield agreement. 
Accordingly, settlement conferences will be held only when 
the choice has truly become one between settlement and a 
formal hearing, and, under such circumstances, IDEA's 
policy of holding down costs is served by allowing recovery 
of fees. 
 
IV. 
 
There is neither statutory language nor substantial case 
law defining what constitutes an IEP Team Meeting. 4 But 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The phrase "meeting of the IEP Team" is contained only in the 1997 
amendments. 20 U.S.C. S 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). IDEA defines the "IEP Team" 
as "a group of individuals composed of " the child's parents, certain 
teachers, other persons trained in working with children with 
disabilities, other individuals familiar with the child and the local 
curricular offerings, and, whenever appropriate, the child him- or 
herself. 
Id. S 1414(d)(1)(B). The IEP Team is charged with developing and revising 
a child's IEP and must consider certain factors. Individual members of 
the IEP Team are given certain responsibilities. See id. S 1414(d)(3-5). 
Other provisions of the statute instruct the IEP Team to consider 
particular data or attach consequences to determinations made by the 
IEP Team. See S 1414(c)(1); id. S (2); id. S (4); id. S (d)(1)(A)(v)(I); 
id. 
S (vii)(II); id. S 1415(k)(1)(B)(ii); id. S (3)(A); id. S (4)(B-C). One 
Section 
attaches specified consequences to a failure of the child's parents to 
inform the IEP Team that they are rejecting a proposed placement for 
their child. See id. S 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I)(aa). Nowhere, however, does 
the 
statute provide real guidance for determining whether a meeting is one 
of the IEP Team. 
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absent controlling authority to guide us, I would hold, for 
the reasons stated above, that parties may designate a 
meeting as a settlement conference rather than an IEP 
Team Meeting. Because I believe that under any standard 
of review the parties did so in this case, I conclude that the 
parents' request for attorneys fees is not barred by the 
1997 amendments, and I would affirm the District Court's 
order granting fees on this alternate ground. 
 
The District Court held that the October 20 meeting was 
an IEP Team Meeting. See A28 ("It is therefore the Court's 
view that regardless of what the meeting was labeled, it was 
a meeting of the IEP team within the meaning of the Act."). 
The Court agrees.5 See opinion of the Court at 5, 7. I do not. 
 
The first question, which the Court does not even 
address, is the appropriate standard for reviewing the 
District Court's decision that the October 20 meeting was 
one of Daniel's IEP Team. Some of the District Court's 
statements, i.e., those about the identities of the people at 
the meeting, the fact that they signed a sheet titled 
"Settlement Conference," and the matters discussed at the 
meeting, are findings of fact that should be reviewed for 
clear error. On the other hand, the meaning of the phrase 
"meeting of the IEP Team" is a legal question that should be 
reviewed de novo. I need not determine the appropriate 
standard for reviewing the District Court's application of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Curiously, the Court appears to suggest that this issue is not before 
us because "[t]he School District takes no issue with the District Court's 
conclusion that the October 20th meeting was an IEP Team Meeting." 
Opinion of the Court at 7. While this observation is true--after all, the 
School District cannot prevail on this appeal unless the October 20 
meeting was one of Daniel's IEP Team--it is also irrelevant. The School 
District has appealed the District Court's judgment awarding attorneys 
fees to the parents. Before this Court, the parents argue, inter alia, 
that 
we should affirm the District Court's judgment because the October 20 
meeting "was not an IEP team meeting." Because a party that ultimately 
prevailed before a district court may urge affirmance on different 
grounds, this issue is properly before us. See Alvin v. Suzuki, No. 99- 
3245, 2000 WL 1281478, at *1 (3d. Cir., Sept. 12, 2000) (affirming a 
district court's decision to grant summary judgment against a plaintiff 
alleging a procedural due process violation on different grounds from 
those articulated by the district court). 
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the law to the facts, however, because I conclude that 
under any standard of review the District Court erred in 
holding that the October 20 meeting was one of Daniel's 
IEP Team. 
 
I will begin with the objective evidence. Although IDEA 
provides no definition for the phrase "meeting of the IEP 
Team," there are, as I see it, three characteristics of such 
meetings that inform the inquiry, and each of these factors 
supports the conclusion that the October 20 meeting was a 
settlement conference rather than an IEP Team Meeting. 
The first characteristic of an IEP Team Meeting is the 
identities of those in attendance. Unlike every previous 
meeting of Daniel's IEP Team (a series of four meetings 
spanning six months), counsel for both parties attended the 
October 20 meeting. Lawyers are not mentioned in the 
section of IDEA listing members of an IEP Team. See 20 
U.S.C. SS 1414(d)(1)(b)(i)-(vii). In contrast, lawyers are 
mentioned in the section of IDEA providing for the 
procedural rights that parents must be accorded at due 
process hearings. See id. S 1415(h). 
 
Further, as the admittedly sparse legislative history to 
the 1997 amendments demonstrates, IEP Team Meetings 
are meant to be fora at which parents and school 
administrators--outside the presence of counsel and the 
threat of litigation--can resolve their differences and arrive 
at an IEP best suited to the disabled child's interests. See 
H.R. Rep. No. 105-95, at 105 (1997), reprinted in 1997 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 103 ("The Committee believes that the IEP 
process should be devoted to determining the needs of the 
child and planning for the child's education with parents 
and school personnel. To that end, the bill specifically 
excludes the payment of attorneys' fees for attorney 
participation in IEP meetings, unless such meetings are 
convened as a result of an administrative proceeding or 
judicial action."). Thus, in terms of participants, the 
October 20 meeting was more like a settlement conference 
arranged in anticipation of a due process hearing than a 
typical IEP Team Meeting. 
 
In its conclusory disagreement, the Court appears to 
adopt the District Court's reasoning that because"the 
parties in attendance, with the exception of Ms. Clausen, 
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were members of the IEP team," the meeting was inherently 
"a meeting of the IEP team within the meaning of the Act." 
This seems wrong to me for two reasons. First, it glosses 
over the fact that attorneys for both parties were present6 
(which, for the reasons explained above, is highly 
significant). Second, it assumes that any meeting including 
the members of a child's IEP Team is a "meeting of the IEP 
Team" within the meaning of IDEA. But individuals who 
make up the membership of a group may meet without 
thereby convening the group. The panel of this Court, for 
example, could surely go out for a social lunch without 
constituting the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit. While I recognize that the purpose of the 
October 20 meeting was to agree on a satisfactory IEP for 
Daniel (which is, at least, related to the normal purpose of 
an IEP Team meeting), this does nothing to undercut the 
argument that the mere presence of members of the IEP 
Team cannot be decisive. 
 
A second characteristic of an IEP Team Meeting is its 
subject matter. As the District Court noted in its opinion, 
the parties did meet to discuss Daniel's IEP. In fact, there 
was pressure to agree upon the IEP because neither party 
wanted to go through a due process hearing and risk losing 
control over the outcome while incurring the costs of 
presentation before an administrative tribunal. Thus, while 
the basic subject matter of the October 20 meeting was 
consistent with IEP Team Meetings in general, the 
chemistry of the meeting was transformed by the presence 
of negotiating counsel. In short, the meeting was more like 
the settlement conference it had been titled by the parties 
than like an IEP Team Meeting. 
 
A final characteristic of IEP Team Meetings--at least in 
Pennsylvania, and not present in this case--is the type of 
notice school districts must provide parents before 
scheduling a meeting. Pennsylvania law requires that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The District Court's statement that all those in attendance except 
Clausen (the parents' lawyer) were members of Daniel's IEP Team 
appears to be clearly erroneous. The statement of undisputed facts 
submitted by the parties states that counsel for the School District, who 
was not a member of Daniel's IEP Team, was also present. 
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school districts formally notify parents when IEP Team 
Meetings will be held. See 22 Pa. Code 342.32(c)(2). This 
notice must inform the parents of the IEP Team Meeting's 
purpose as well as who will be in attendance. See id. The 
undisputed record reflects that the School District did not 
provide such notice to Daniel's parents before the October 
20 meeting. 
 
In addition, other aspects of the parties' conduct support 
the view that the October 20 meeting was a settlement 
conference rather than an IEP Team Meeting. The meeting 
was arranged when Clausen (counsel for the parents) 
contacted counsel for the School District. Clausen's letter 
suggesting a meeting referred to it as a "settlement 
conference," and the response by the counsel for the School 
District never objected to this characterization. 
Furthermore, each person in attendance (including counsel 
for the School District but excluding Clausen) signed a 
sheet of paper titled "Settlement Conference." Whether or 
not these two references standing alone would establish as 
a matter of law that what took place on October 20 was not 
an IEP Team Meeting, I can reach no other conclusion 
when the evidence is considered in its entirety. I therefore 
would affirm the District Court's judgment on this alternate 
ground. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
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